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Abstract 
With the development of IoT technologies in the past few years, a wide range of 
smart devices are deployed in a variety of environments aiming to improve the quality 
of human life in a cost efficient way. Due to the increasingly serious aging problem 
around the world, smart homes for elder healthcare have become an important IoT-
based application, which not only enables elders’ health to be properly monitored and 
taken care of, but also allows them to live more comfortably and independently in 
their houses. However, elders’ privacy might be disclosed from smart homes due to 
non-fully protected network communication. To show that elders’ privacy could be 
substantially exposed, in this paper we develop a Privacy Deduction Scheme (PDS for 
short) by eavesdropping sensor traffic from a smart home to identify elders’ 
movement activities and speculating sensor locations in the smart home based on a 
series of deductions from the viewpoint of an attacker. The experimental results based 
on sensor datasets from real smart homes demonstrate the effectiveness of PDS in 
deducing and disclosing elders’ privacy, which might be maliciously exploited by 
attackers to endanger elders and their properties. 
 
Keywords: Internet of Things, IoT, Smart Home, Privacy, Deduction, Association 
Rule Learning 
*corresponding author 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the advances in the semiconductor technology enables to cost-
efficiently integrate wireless network connectivity in embedded processors and 
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sensors, which leads to the development of Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. In IoT 
paradigm, many different objects or devices that surround us connect together using 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) and sensor network technologies (e.g., Z-
Wave and ZigBee). IoT connects more and more devices every day. It is expected that 
we will have 24 billion IoT devices by 2020 [2]. IoT enables different smart 
environments with different smart devices, including sensors, actuators, displays, and 
computational components to monitor and control the environment, and interact with 
users to provide them with automated, customized, and comfortable services [3][4]. 
For instance, a smart environment could be a smart home, smart community, smart 
building, smart city, or smart grid. IoT also enables numerous applications, such as 
healthcare [4][5][6], energy conservation [7], home automation [8], remote access 
services [3][9], agriculture [10][11], security [12][13][14], surveillance 
[9][15][16][17], and transportation [18]. 
      Among these applications, elder healthcare attracts a lot of attentions in recent 
years since aging population becomes a serious problem [4][19]. According to the 
Population Reference Bureau report [20], the number of Americans ages 65 and 
older is 46 millions today and will increase to over 98 millions by 2060. The UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division also predicts that 
there will be more elderly people than children, particularly in Europe. The ratio 15-
year-olds to 65-year-olds will be 4:1 in 2050 [21]. Using smart home technology, 
elders’ health can be properly taken care of, and the corresponding healthcare cost can 
be dramatically reduced. It also allows elderly people to live more comfortably and 
independently in their houses and prevent them from social isolation. 
      In most cases, a smart home for elder healthcare consists of a smart hub, motion 
sensors, door sensors, and other sensors, which all connect together via Z-Wave or 
ZigBee (see the left part of Figure 1). The hub also connects to a router via WiFi or 
Ethernet so as to communicate with a cloud server on Internet. These sensors provide 
rich information about the house environment and its residents, i.e., elders. The data 
sensed by different sensors is transmitted via Internet to the cloud server and analyzed. 
When an accident happens, e.g., an elder passes out on the floor, subsequent actions 
will be performed to timely deal with the accident. However, during the data 
transmission, elders’ privacy such as their activities of daily living (ADLs), which 
refer to basic self-care activities for determining the independence of elderly people in 
their daily lives [22], might be exposed if attackers employ sophisticated 
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eavesdropping tools [23][24][25][26]. Researches [23][24][27] have shown that many 
IoT devices and networks might disclose homeowners’ privacy, including what TV 
programs they are watching, what sensors have been triggered, where their homes 
might be, and if they are home or not. 
      To show that elders’ privacy could be seriously disclosed from smart homes, we 
extend PMA (Privacy Mining Approach for short) [47] and develop in this paper a 
Privacy Deduction Scheme (PDS for short) from the viewpoint of an attacker. PDS 
identifies elders’ activities in smart homes from sensor reading, particularly their 
movements inside the houses. Based on identified activities, PDS infers how sensors 
spatially related to each other and then derives a global sensor topology, which 
reveals how sensors are deployed in the smart home. By conducting a series of 
deductions based on data mining, PDS is able to infer sensor locations and elders’ 
daily routines without physical invasion.  
    To demonstrate the deduction performance of PDS, we apply PDS on two real 
smart homes with different layouts and different combinations of residents/elders. The 
experimental results show that, no matter in which case, PDS is able to deduce a 
global sensor topology that corresponds to the real one, infer most sensors in 
bedrooms, kitchen/dining room, and entrances with a high accuracy rate, and obtain 
the elders’ daily routines in these places.  
    The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related work. 
Section 3 presents the methodology of PDS. In Section 4, extensive experiments are 
conducted and experimental results are discussed. Sections 5 and 6 discuss and 
conclude this paper, respectively.  
 
2. Related Work 
During the last few years, many security and privacy problems have arisen across IoT 
devices and networks, from networked light bulbs that can provide back doors into 
WiFi networks, to baby monitors that allow hackers to easily access the livestreams, 
and to network refrigerators that have been used in DDoS attacks [27]. Researchers 
investigated commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) IoT devices and found that these 
devices might disclose homeowners’ privacy. As an example, Yoshigoe et al. [24] 
studied Samsung SmartThings platform and discovered that the network traffic sent 
from SmartThing Hub significantly reduces when homeowners are not at home. Such 
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information not only reveals homeowners’ privacy, but also might endanger 
homeowners and their properties. The authors also found that each kind of sensor 
(e.g., door sensors, light sensors, and motion sensors) has a unique traffic (hand-
shaking) pattern between the SmartThings Hub and a cloud server. Therefore, even 
though the traffic is encrypted by SSL, attackers are still able to guess the 
corresponding sensor types and know which sensors are triggered. Furthermore, 
homeowners’ location details might be revealed by the IP addresses of their smart 
devices [23], and sensitive information about smart homes and the residents might be 
leaked due to insecure communication [28]. In this paper, we further show that it is 
possible to disclose even more privacy by conducting a series of deductions on sensor 
reading from smart homes.  
    Many researchers proposed activity recognition methods to recognize common 
human activities from sensor reading (i.e., a low-level sensor dataset). Based on 
different requirements of smart environments, activity recognition can be either 
vision-based or sensor-based [29]. The former uses visual sensing facilities, such as 
video cameras, to monitor people’s behavior and environmental changes. This 
approach is well known for suffering from privacy and ethics issues [6] [29][30]. The 
latter uses embedded sensors (such as motion sensors and door sensors) or wearable 
sensors (such as RFID tags attached to homeowners). Our focus in this paper is to 
expose elders’ privacy from sensor data sent from embedded sensors since we are 
interested in understanding how elders move from sensors to sensors, which allows us 
to deduce the global sensor deployment of the corresponding smart homes.   
    Activity recognition can be divided into two major categories: supervised learning 
and unsupervised learning. In a supervised activity recognition method [31][32][33], 
each sensor event has its activity label, such as personal hygiene, enter home, bathing, 
bed to toilet, etc. For examples, Zhao et al. [34] proposed conditional random fields 
(CRFs)-based classifier to recognize human activities, and Inomata et al. [35] utilized 
Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) framework to recognize activities from 
interaction data collected by a RFID tag system. The authors in [36] used static 
Bayesian model and DBN, both with k-Observation history matrix, to recognize 
activities of ADLs from sensor readings, where k is the number of timesteps they look 
into the past. Lu et al. [6] proposed a method that extracts latent features from sensor 
data by using Beta Process Hidden Markov Model (BP-HMM). However, it is well 
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known that all the supervised methods suffer from a problem of manually labeling for 
all activities in training phase, which is time-consuming and laborious [19].           
      To solve this problem, unsupervised methods [5][19][37][38][39] have been 
proposed to automatically recognize human activities in smart homes. For instances, 
Rashidi et al. [5] presented an unsupervised method for discovering and tracking 
activities that homeowners normally perform as part of their daily routines in smart 
homes. Gu et al. [38] proposed a fingerprint-based algorithm to recognize activities 
such that it can mine large number of activity models on the web without manual 
labeling. The authors in [37] introduced an Emerging Patterns based approach, which 
describes significant changes between two classes of data, to recognize sequential, 
interleaved, and concurrent activities. Rashidi and Cook [39] proposed a stream 
mining method, which is extended from the tilted-time window approach [40], for 
automatically discovering human activity patterns over time from streaming sensor 
data. 
      Different from all the above supervised and unsupervised approaches, in this 
paper, we are not interested in what exactly each activity does (i.e., the label of each 
activity) since our goal is not to recognize elders’ different activities. Instead, we 
attempt to identify elders’ movements from a series of sensor reading because these 
reveal how they move in their smart homes, which enables us to reason the 
relationship between sensors so as to deduce a global topology. We develop PDS 
based on PMA [47] by further considering concurrent elders’ movements, speculating 
elder routines, and validating PDS with two different use cases.  
 
3. The methodology of PDS 
The right part of Figure 1 shows the workflow of PDS to deduce elders’ privacy in a 
smart home. First of all, PDS eavesdrops sensor data sent from the smart home and 
then preprocesses all sensor data that it has eavesdropped into a readable sensor log. 
Figure 2 shows the format of the sensor log. Each log record indicates the time point 
at which a sensor with its unique ID (which could be an IP address) is triggered. The 
above eavesdropping and preprocessing is possible and achievable if an attacker is 
physically close to a smart home and uses some sophisticated eavesdropping tools, 
such as [26], to collect sensor data from the smart home. 
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      After that, PDS deduces the global sensor topology of the smart home by 
identifying all activities performed by the elders living in this smart home from the 
log, especially their movements. With the derived topology and the sensor log, PDS 
conducts a series of deductions based on Frequent Pattern Mining to reason sensor 
locations in the smart home. Finally, PDS speculates the elders’ daily routines 
according to the derived sensor locations and the log. In the following, we will detail 
how PDS conducts sensor topology deduction, sensor location reasoning, and elder 
routine speculation.  
 
Figure 1. The workflow of PDS.	
 
 
Figure 2. The format of sensor log. 
3.1 Sensor Topology Deduction 
This section describes how PDS deduces a global sensor topology for a smart home. 
To this purpose, we define two kinds of elder activities: indoor activity and leave-
back activity. The former refers to an elder’s movement in his/her house. Instead of 
identifying all kinds of activities, we are particularly interested in knowing how elders 
move in their homes since it enables us to infer how sensors are deployed in the 
homes. Therefore, in this paper, an indoor activity is an activity that lasts for a while 
and triggers a sequence of sensors. The rule to identify an indoor activity is defined as 
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“A sequence of sensors are triggered during a time period of at least 𝑥 seconds, and 
the interval between any two adjacent sensors is at most 𝑦 seconds where 𝑥 > 𝑦”.  
 
Figure 3. An example of indoor activity. 
      Taking Figure 3 as an example in which 𝑥 = 40 sec and 𝑦 = 10 sec, we know 
that the first six log records are considered as an indoor activity because their duration 
is 42 sec and the interval periods between any two adjacent records are no longer than 
10 seconds. However, the last record is not considered as a part of the same activity 
since its interval period with the previous record is more than 10 seconds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)  (b) 
Figure 4. An example showing how multiple elders’ movements are falsely deduced 
as an indoor activity. 
      According to the above rule, it is clear that all identified indoor activities will not 
overlap with each other in terms of time. However, it is possible that multiple elders’ 
concurrent movements are falsely identified as an indoor activity. For example, as 
illustrated in Figure 4(a), an elder moves from the kitchen to the living room (which 
triggers sensors S1 and S2) and meanwhile another elder moves from his bedroom to 
a toilet (which triggers sensors S3 and S4). The two movements might be falsely 
considered as an indoor activity if the definition rule holds, and its sensor-trigger 
sequence could be anyone of those depicted in Figure 4(b), which misleads PDS that a 
elder has such movement between these sensors and consequently misguides PDS in 
deducting a global sensor topology. In addition, it is also possible that two elders’ 
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movements that happen sequentially one after another are falsely identified as an 
indoor activity. These issues will be addressed and mitigated later in this paper. 
      On the other hand, a leave-back activity refers to the action that an elder leaves 
his/her house and then comes back after a while. When the elder leaves, a sensor 
deployed either on the door or near the house entrance will be triggered. The same 
sensor will be triggered again when the elder comes back. If there is no other in the 
house, no sensor in the house should be triggered during this time period. Hence, the 
rule to identify a leave-back activity is defined as “A sensor is triggered at time point 𝑢 and it is triggered again at time point 𝑣, where 𝑢 < 𝑣. The duration between 𝑢 and 𝑣 must last at least 𝑧 seconds, and no other sensors are triggered during this period.” 
For example, the two log records shown in Figure 5 will be deduced as a leave-back 
activity if 𝑧 is 3600 seconds.  
 
 
Figure 5. An example of leave-back activity.  
      Based on the above rules, PDS identifies all indoor activities and leave-back 
activities from the sensor log. Note that when an elder goes to sleep or takes a nap for 
more than 𝑧 seconds, the sensor deployed in his/her bedroom will be triggered, and 
this action might be misjudged as a leave-back activity. This problem will be solved 
later in the paper. 
      After identifying all indoor activities and leave-back activities, PDS deduces a 
global sensor topology by translating each indoor activity into a set of directed edges. 
This set of directed edges not only shows the elders’ movements between sensors to 
perform the activity, but also reveals the spatial relationship of these sensors in the 
smart home. Recall that the activity shown in Figure 3 is an indoor activity, which can 
be translated into the following set of directed edges. Clearly it shows that the elder 
moves from S027 to S003, S012, S023, S003, and S022 for performing the indoor 
activity.  
S027→S003, S003→S012, S012→S023, S023→S003, S003→S022 
      After translating all identified indoor activities into corresponding directed-edge 
sets, PDS accumulates a confidence value i for every directed edge A→B (where 𝐴 
and 𝐵  are two different sensors in the smart home, and i is the total number of 
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occurrences that A→B appears in all the directed-edge sets). The higher value of i, the 
more confidence that the elder can directly move from sensor 𝐴 to sensor 𝐵. Based on 
the following two rules, a global sensor topology can be constructed.   
Rule 1: If both A→B and B→A have a confidence value larger than a predefined 
threshold 𝛼, PDS is confident that the elders are able to directly move from 
A to B and vice versa. Hence, PDS adds a bidirectional solid edge between 𝐴 
and 𝐵. Note that 𝛼 = 0123 where 𝛽 is the summation of the confidence values 
of all the directed edges, and 𝛾 is the total number of all the directed edges. 
In other words, 𝛼 is the average confidence value of all the directed edges.  
Rule 2: If only A→B or only B→A has a confidence value larger than 𝛼 , PDS 
presumes that the elder is possible to directly move from A to B and vice 
versa. In this case, PDS adds a bidirectional dash edge between 𝐴 and 𝐵.  
      Recall that multiple elders’ concurrent movements and sequential movements 
might be separately identified as an indoor activity, which in turn falsely creates 
connections between sensors that in reality are not directly reachable for elders in a 
smart home. Employing Rule 1 helps to mitigate this problem. From the viewpoint of 
probability, it is unlikely that exactly the same two movements performed by multiple 
elders occur concurrently or sequentially very often, and it is also impossible that 
many falsely identified indoor activities have the same sensor-trigger sequence. Back 
to the previous example, it might be possible that an elder moves from the kitchen to 
the living room and another moves from his bedroom to the toilet at the same time. 
However, it is unlikely that such concurrent actions happen frequently and result in 
the same sensor-trigger sequence. Therefore, the side effect caused by falsely 
identified indoor activities could be significantly suppressed by Rule 1.   
      Apparently, Rule 2 is less strict than Rule 1, and it might not be helpful to 
suppress falsely identified indoor activities. However, it enables PDS to derive a 
global view of sensors since most sensors could be therefore connected together.  
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The sensor-location deduction algorithm 
Input: All indoor activities of a smart home in 𝑤 days and global sensor topology  
Output: Bedroom sensors, kitchen/dining room sensors, and entrances sensors. 
Procedure: 
1: Let 𝐴 be an empty set; 
2: for each indoor activity that occurred between 2 am and 6 am of the 𝑤 days{ 
3:      Translate the activity into a sensor-ID list;  
4:      Put the sensor-ID list into 𝐴;} 
5: Apply ARL with minSupport = 0.5 on 𝐴;  
6: Let 𝑖 = 1;  
7: do { 
8:      Choose a sensor set from the outcome of ARL if this set is the largest one and its  
9:      occurrence is the most frequent compared with all other sets of the same size; 
10:      Let this set be 𝐵 and output 𝐵 as sensors in bedroom 𝑖;  
11:      while a sensor in the topology has bidirectional edges with at least a half of 𝐵{ 
12:           Consider this sensor to be in bedroom 𝑖; 
13:           Put the sensor into 𝐵;} 
14:      Discard any sensor-ID list that contains any sensor of 𝐵 from 𝐴; 
15:      Apply ARL with minSupport = 0.5 on 𝐴 again;  
16:      𝑖 = 𝑖 + 1; 
17: }while ARL outputs at least one sensor set & the size of the set is larger than 1; 
18: Let 𝐶 be an empty set; 
19: for each indoor activity that occurred between 6 pm and 7 pm of the 𝑤 days{ 
20:     Translate the activity into a sensor-ID list;  
21:     Put the sensor-ID list into 𝐶;} 
22: Apply ARL with minSupport = 0.5 on 𝐶; 
23: Choose a sensor set from the outcome of ARL if this set is the largest one and its 
24: occurrence is the most frequent compared with all other sets of the same size; 
25: Let this set be 𝐾 and output 𝐾 as sensors in kitchen/dining room; 
26: while a sensor in the topology has bidirectional edges with at least a half of 𝐾{ 
27:       Also consider this sensor as a sensor in the kitchen/dining room; 
28:       Put the sensor into 𝐾;} 
29: Let 𝑒=1;   
30: for each leave-back activity{ 
31:      if the sensor in the activity does not equal to any deduced bedroom sensor{ 
32:          Consider it as an entrance sensor;  
33:          if the sensor is the first deduced entrance sensor{ 
34:              Create an empty entrance-sensor set 𝐸, and put the sensor into 𝐸,; 
35:          }else{ 
36:             Let f  = false;  
37:             for j=1 to 𝑒 {  //Note that 𝑒 is the total number of entrance-sensor sets;  
38:                   if the sensor has bidirectional edges with at least a half of 𝐸-{ 
39:                       Consider the sensor is close to the location of 𝐸-;  
40:                       Put the sensor into 𝐸-;} 
41:                       f  = true; }} 
42:             if f == false{ 
43:                  Create a new entrance-sensor set and put the sensor into this set; 
44:                  e=e+1;}}}} 
Figure 6. The sensor-location deduction algorithm. 
3.2 Sensor Location Reasoning 
Human are creatures of habit [41]. Everyone has his/her own daily routine and this 
routine mostly remain similar every day. For instance, an elder might wake up around 
7 am everyday. If we monitor this elder long enough, we are able to see this 
phenomenon. Because of this, PDS needs to collect sensor data from a smart home 
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and derives all the corresponding indoor activities for a sufficiently long period of 
time in order to be able to deduce sensor locations. Let 𝑤 be the total number of days 
in the period. In this paper, Association Rule Learning (ARL) [42] is used to find 
sensors associated with the same location. ARL is a rule-based machine learning 
method for finding groups of items that are commonly found together in a dataset, and 
it is typically used for market-basket analysis. In this method, the rule X ⇒ Y holds 
with minSupport 𝑠 if at least 𝑠 ∗ 100% of a dataset contain both X and Y where 0 <𝑠 < 1. In other words, both X and Y appear together in at least 𝑠 ∗ 100% of the dataset.  
      Figure 6 illustrates the algorithm utilized by PDS to deduce sensor locations. In 
this paper, we mainly focus on bedrooms, kitchen/dining room, and entrances. 
Deducing other places will be our future work. Note that here we do not differentiate 
kitchen and dining room because in many houses they are in the same place. PDS first 
deduces bedroom sensors (see lines 1 to 17) by reasonably assuming that most people 
stay in their bedrooms between 2 am and 6 am, implying that the sensors deployed in 
bedrooms are very likely to be triggered during this time period. PDS translates every 
indoor activity that occurred between 2 am and 6 am of these 𝑤 days into a sensor-ID 
list by extracting all distinct sensor IDs from the activity. For example, the sensor-ID 
list of the indoor activity shown in Figure 3 is {S027, S003, S012, S023, S022}. Let 𝐴 
be a set of sensor-ID lists that associates with all indoor activities occurred between 2 
am and 6 am of the 𝑤 days. PDS then applies ARL with minSupport of 0.5 on 𝐴 to 
find out all possible sets of sensors that satisfy the minSupport, i.e., the majority.  
      In order to deduce as much bedroom sensors as possible, PDS chooses a set when 
is the largest one and the occurrence of this set is the most frequent one as compared 
with all other sets of the same size (see lines 8 and 9). Because of the assumption, this 
set of sensors is therefore deduced as sensors in a same bedroom. Let 𝐵 be these 
sensors. After that, PDS attempts to deduce more sensors in the same bedroom by 
referring and inspecting the global sensor topology as follows: If any sensor in the 
topology has bidirectional edges with at least a half of 𝐵 based on majority rule, we 
believe that this is not a coincident caused by multiple elders’ concurrent movements. 
Thus, PDS deduces that this sensor is also in the same bedroom. Furthermore, it is 
possible that a smart home has more than one bedroom. By removing all sensor-ID 
lists that contains any known bedroom sensor from 𝐴 and repeating the above steps, 
PDS is able to find sensors in other bedrooms. 
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      Next, PDS deduces sensors in the kitchen/dining room (see lines 18 to 28) under 
the assumption that most people stay in their kitchens/dining rooms between 6 pm and 
7 pm. Based on this assumption, PDS translates each indoor activity that occurred 
between this time period of the 𝑤 days into a sensor-ID list and repeats the same 
procedure (i.e., using ARL and checking the global sensor topology) to deduce all 
possible sensors in the kitchen/dining room. Due to the fact that ARL with the 
minSupport of 0.5 is employed, it is unlikely that a sensor that has been deduced as a 
bedroom sensor is also deduced as a kitchen/dining room sensor because, normally 
speaking, in most cases people do not stay in their bedrooms during 6 pm and 7 pm. 
      PDS continues by deducing entrance sensors (see lines 29 to 44). Recall that an 
indoor activity might be misjudged as a leave-back activity if an elder goes to sleep or 
takes a nap for longer than 𝑧 seconds. This issue could be addressed by elimination as 
follows: If a sensor has been deduced as a bedroom sensor, it is impossible to be an 
entrance sensor at the same time. Therefore, the sensor of a leave-back activity is 
confirmed to be an entrance sensor if it does not equal to any bedroom sensor that 
PDS has deduced. By further checking the global sensor topology (see lines 37 to 41), 
PDS can easily know how an entrance sensor is spatially related to other entrance 
sensors and deduce the total number of entrances in the smart home. In other words, 
PDS is able to deduce possible sensors at different entrances.   
3.3 Elder Routine Speculation 
With the knowledge of bedroom sensors, kitchen/dining room sensors, and entrance 
sensors, PDS is able to infer elders’ daily routines in these places by using all the 
known sensors to mine the sensor log and meanwhile taking all identified indoor 
activities and leave-back activities into account. Our goal is to find as much as 
possible elders’ activities in the above places, so we consider both crossing-sensor 
indoor activities and non-crossing-sensor indoor activities. The former type of 
activities refers to indoor activities that individually involve only one sensor. A 
typical example is that an elder cooks in the kitchen and only triggers one area sensor. 
The latter type of activities refers to indoor activities involving more than one sensor. 
A representative example is that an elder walks from one room to another room and 
therefore triggers several sensors. By accumulating all crossing-sensor indoor 
activities and non-crossing-sensor indoor activities occurred in bedrooms, PDS is able 
to know the frequency of elders’ bedroom activities and the time periods these 
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activities might happen. In other words, PDS knows when and how frequent the 
bedrooms of a smart home are used. Similarly, PDS knows the utilization pattern of 
the kitchen/dining room by accumulating all crossing-sensor indoor activities and 
non-crossing-sensor indoor activities occurred in kitchen/dining room. By analyzing 
all derived leave-back activities, PDS even knows when and how frequent the elders 
leave their houses.  
 
4. Experimental Results 
To evaluate the ability of PDS on deducing elders’ privacy, we chose two real smart 
homes provided by WSU CASAS smart home project [43] to be our use cases. Table 
I shows the characteristics of the two smart homes. The first smart home “Milan” has 
only one floor, and the residents in this house are an old woman and a dog.  The 
second smart home “Tulum” has two floors, and a couple live in this house. The 
reason we chose these two houses is that both of them have more than one resident, 
which might cause multiple indoor activities and therefore interfere PDS to deduce 
sensor relationships and sensor locations. Both smart homes have their own datasets 
recording the time at which a sensor is triggered. The dataset of Milan contains 
433,665 sensor records generated by 7 area motion sensors, 21 motion sensors, 3 door 
closure sensors, and 2 temperature sensors. On the other hand, the dataset of Tulum 
contains 1,085,902 sensor records generated by 5 area motion sensors, 26 motion 
sensors, and 5 temperature sensors. In the following experiments, we ignored the 
sensor data generated by temperature sensors since this data is irrelevant. To simulate 
sensor traffic, we sequentially replayed each sensor record of these datasets and 
launched PDS.  
Table I. The characteristics of two real smart homes. 
Name Num. of Floors Residents Sensors 
Milan 1 An old woman and 
a dog 
7 area motion sensors, 21 motion sensors, 
3 door sensors, and 2 temperature sensors 
Tulum 2 A couple 5 area motion sensors, 26 motion sensors, 
and 5 temperature sensors 
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Figure 7. The Layout and sensor deployment of smart home Milan [44]. Note that the 
sensing coverage of an area motion sensor is represented by an oval. The sensing 
coverage of the other sensors is individually represented by a small circle. 
 
 
Figure 8. Total number of sensor groups in Milan deduced by PDS over time.  
 
4.1 Case Study I: Milan 
Figure 7 illustrates the layout and sensor deployment of Milan. Our goal is to see if 
PDS can correctly deduce a global sensor topology and infer sensors deployed in the 
bedrooms, kitchen/dining room, and entrances of Milan without knowing Figure 7. In 
this experiment, PDS eavesdropped Milan by using parameters 𝑥 = 40 sec, 𝑦 = 10 
sec, and 𝑧 = 3600 sec to identify all indoor activities and leave-back activities. The 
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reason we adopted these parameters will be explained later in the discussion section. 
As shown in Figure 8, PDS was able to connect all the sensors that it found into 21 
sensor groups after it eavesdropped Milan for just one day. Note that a sensor group is 
a group of sensors with directed edges connecting these sensors, implying that there is 
no directed edge between any two sensor groups. The number of sensor groups 
decreased to two on day 5, but it increased to three on day 6 because a new sensor 
appeared and was discovered by PDS. After day 6, the number of sensor groups 
remained identical as 3 and did not decrease any more. The reason is that the residents 
of Milan did not have lot of movements to certain places of the house, so the relevant 
sensors do not have sufficient directed edges with all other sensors.  
      By referring the number of sensor groups, we can determine an appropriate 
eavesdropping period for PDS to balance the trade-off between its deduction 
performance and the time effort required by an attacker to run PDS. As we can see 
from Figure 8, eavesdropping Milan for 6 days (sensor data was from Oct. 16th 2009 
to Oct. 21st 2009) is sufficient for PDS and it is the most cost-efficient choice for 
attackers. Therefore, in the rest experiment, PDS utilized the sensor log of these six 
days to conduct its deduction.  
 
(a) The temporary global sensor topology 
 
(b) The final global sensor topology 
Figure 9. The global sensor topology of Milan. 
      Figure 9(a) shows the temporary global sensor topology in which a confidence 
value is presented next to each directed edge. A higher confidence value from sensor 𝐴 to sensor 𝐵 implies that PDS is more confident that an elder is able to directly move 
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from sensor 𝐴 to sensor 𝐵, where 𝐴 and 𝐵 are two different sensors in Milan. In the 
case of Milan, threshold 𝛼 = 13 = 0;;<=>?; 3, so the final global sensor topology is the 
one illustrated in Figure 9(b) after Rule 1 and Rule 2 were applied. As compared with 
Figure 9(a), we can see that some edges disappear because their confidence values 
satisfy neither Rule 1 nor Rule 2. These eliminated edges are very likely caused by 
multiple residents’ concurrent or sequential movements.  
      We can observe that PDS made some false deductions. For examples, there should 
be a bidirectional edge between M005 and M006 because the woman living in Milan 
should be able to directly move from M005 to M006 and vice versa according to the 
layout of Milan (see the right upper part of Figure 7). However, PDS was unable to 
deduce such relationship. Besides, from Figure 9(b), we can see that PDS was unable 
to deduce any relationship between M024 and the rest sensors. In other words, M024 
itself is a sensor group. The key reason is that the confidence values between M024 
and all other sensors are all lower than the predefined threshold (see Figure 9(a)), 
implying that the woman did not have a lot of movements to the place where M024 is 
deployed. The same situation happens for D002, so D002 itself is also a sensor group.  
 
Figure 10. The sensor spatial relationships of Milan and those deduced by PDS. Note 
that all false deductions are highlighted. 
      Figure 10 shows the inference accuracy of PDS on the sensor relationships of 
Milan where  
1. 1/1 in attribute (𝐴/𝐵) means that sensor 𝐵 is directly reachable from sensor 𝐴 
according to the layout of Milan, and PDS is able to deduce a direct edge from 𝐴 to 𝐵 (i.e., 𝐴 → 𝐵). 
2. 1/0 in attribute (𝐴/𝐵) means that 𝐵 is directly reachable from 𝐴 based on the 
layout, but PDS is unable to deduce direct edge 𝐴 → 𝐵. 
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3. 0/0 means that it is unable to directly reach from 𝐴 to 𝐵 based on the layout, 
and PDS is also unable to deduce direct edge 𝐴 → 𝐵. 
4. 0/1 means that it is unable to directly reach from 𝐴 to 𝐵 based on the layout, 
but PDS is able to deduce direct edge 𝐴 → 𝐵. 
      It is clear that PDS makes an incorrect deduction when 1/0 or 0/1 appears. Recall 
that there are 31 sensors in Milan, so the total number of sensor-relationship 
deductions is 930 (=31x31-31). The total number of false deductions is 23 (see all the 
highlights in Figure 10), implying that the accuracy rate of PDS on sensor-
relationship inference is 97.5% ≅ A1 − CD<DEF ∗ 100%.  
      Next, PDS used the algorithm shown in Figure 6 to deduce sensors in the 
bedrooms, kitchen/dining room, and entrances of Milan. PDS first extracted all indoor 
activities between 2 am and 6 am from each of the 6 days. The total number of such 
activities is four, and the corresponding sensor-ID lists are shown in Figure 11. After 
applying ARL with minSupport of 0.5 on the four sensor-ID lists, PDS returned a 
sensor set {M013, M020, M021, M025, M028} because 1) the occurrence ratio of this 
set in the four lists (i.e., 2/4) satisfies the minSupport, 2) this set is the largest one, and 
3) this set has the highest number of occurrences as compared with other sets with the 
same size. Therefore, this set of sensors was deduced as sensors in a bedroom. Since 
all other sensors in the topology except M019 do not have bidirectional edges with a 
half of this set, M019 was deduced as a sensor in the same bedroom. After that, PDS 
attempted to deduce sensors in another bedroom by discarding any sensor-ID list that 
contains any deduce bedroom sensors (i.e., M013, M019, M020, M021, M025, and 
M028). The resulting sensor-ID list is empty, implying that there is no other bedroom 
in Milan, so PDS stopped such deduction. As compared with the sensor deployment 
shown in Figure 7, we can see that PDS made a correct deduction, i.e., there is only 
one bedroom in Milan, and M013, M019, M020, M021, M025, and M028 are indeed 
deployed in the bedroom. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
M013 M020 M021 M025 M028 
M013 M020 M021 M025 M028 
M020 M021 M025 M028 
M020 M025 M028 
Figure 11. All sensor-ID lists between 2 am and 6 am of the entire eavesdropping 
period for deducing bedroom sensors in Milan. 
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      To deduce kitchen/dining room sensors, PDS extracted all indoor activities 
between 6 pm and 7 pm from each of the 6 days. Figure 12 lists all the corresponding 
sensor-ID lists. After applying ARL with minSupport of 0.5 on these lists, PDS 
returned a matching sensor set {M014, M015, M022, M023}. Hence, they were 
deduced as sensors deployed in the kitchen/dining room of Milan. Furthermore, since 
only D003, M012, and M016 in the global topology have bidirectional edges with a 
half of {M014, M015, M022, M023}, these three sensors were all deduced as sensors 
in the kitchen/dining room as well. By comparing the above result with the layout of 
Milan depicted in Figure 7, we know that this deduction is accurate.   
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M014 M015 M022 M023 
M008 M009 M011 M014 M015 M016 M017 M022 M023 M026 
M005 M006 M008 M009 M011 M013 M019 M025 M026 
M011 M014 M015 M016 M017 M018 M022 M023 
M003 M005 M007 M008 M009 M011 M012 M014 M015 M016 M023 M026 
M009 M011 M014 M015 M016 M022 M023 
M007 M008 M009 M011 M014 M015 M016 M019 M022 M023 M026 
M008 M009 M014 M015 M016 M017 M022 
M014 M015 M022 M023 
M014 M015 M022 M023 
M014 M015 M023 
M003 M004 M012 M015 M022 M023 M027 
D003 M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M005 M006 M007 M008 M026 M027 
M012 M014 M022 M023 
M014 M022 M023 
M001 M002 M003 M012 M014 M023 
D003 M012 M014 M023 
M001 M002 M003 M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 M027 
M002 M003 M004 M027 
M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 
D003 M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M014 M015 M023 
M014 M015 M023 
M014 M015 M022 M023 
M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M014 M015 M022 M023 
D003 M011 M014 M015 M016 M017 M022 M023 
M001 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M001 M002 M003 M012 M014 M022 M023 M027 
M001 M002 M003 M006 M007 M008 M009 M010 M012 M014 M022 M023 M026 M027 
M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M003 M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M014 M022 M023 
M012 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M014 M015 M022 M023 
D003 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M014 M022 M023 
M001 M002 M003 M014 M015 M022 M023 
M012 M022 M023 
Figure 12. All sensor-ID lists between 6 pm and 7 pm of the entire eavesdropping 
period for deducing kitchen/dining room sensors in Milan. 
      PDS continued by deducing entrance sensors in Milan. To do so, PDS extracted 
all leave-back activities from the same time period. There are only two sensors in 
these activities: M028 and D001. Recall that M028 was already deduced as a 
bedroom sensor, so it could not be an entrance sensor at the same time. In other words, 
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only D001 is a sensor at the entrance of Milan and this deduction is correct according 
to Figure 7. Note that from the bottom part of Figure 7, we can see that there is a door 
sensor called D003, but PDS was unable to find it since the woman living in Milan 
did not leave the house for more than one hour from the door where D003 is deployed 
according to the sensor log. 
 
Figure 13. The accumulated number of indoor activities in Milan’s bedroom during 
the entire eavesdropping period. 
      Figure 13 shows the accumulated number of crossing-sensor indoor activities and 
non-crossing-sensor indoor activities occurred in Milan’s bedroom during the 
eavesdropping period. As an attacker, we can observe the following patterns: (1) No 
activity was found during 00:00 to 03:00 of the entire eavesdropping period, implying 
that the woman living in Milan may fall into a deep sleep during this period; (2) 
Starting from 03:00, there were some movements, including crossing-sensor and non-
crossing-sensor activities, and the number of movements kept increasing after 07:00, 
implying that the woman might get up after 7 am; (3) Many crossing-sensor indoor 
activities were found in the bedroom during the daytime, especially between 11:00 
and 12:00. Therefore, we know that the woman frequently stays in the bedroom 
during this period; (4) The woman is very likely to sleep between 21:00 and 00:00 
since there was no activity in the bedroom before and after this period.  
      Figure 14 illustrates the accumulated number of crossing-sensor indoor activities 
and non-crossing-sensor indoor activities occurred in Milan’s kitchen/dining room 
during the eavesdropping period. The results show that it is very likely that the 
woman’s breakfast time is after 08:00 because no activity was observed before 08:00. 
Furthermore, her dinner time might be between 17:00 and 19:00 since lots of 
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movements were found in the kitchen/dining room during this period. This statement 
can be further supported because the residents’ movements in the kitchen/dining room 
dramatically reduced after 19:00.  
 
Figure 14. The accumulated number of indoor activities in Milan’s kitchen/dining 
room during the entire eavesdropping period.  
      During the entire eavesdropping period, PDS found only one leave-back activity 
occurred from 12:32 to 14:43 on Oct. 16th when 𝑧 = 3600 sec. Therefore, we can 
deduce that the woman usually stays at home, and she did not frequently go out 
together with her dog for more than one hour.  
      Based on the above deduction results, we confirm that PDS is able to expose a lot 
of information about Milan, including the global sensor topology, sensors in several 
places, and most importantly the woman’s daily pattern. 
4.2 Cast Study II: Tulum 
In the section, we show the deduction ability of PDS on Tulum without knowing the 
layout and sensor deployments of Tulum depicted in Figure 15. PDS employed the 
same parameters that it used for Milan to identify all indoor activities and leave-back 
activities that occurred in Tulum by replaying and eavesdropping the sensor dataset of 
Tulum. The first date of the data is Sept. 27th 2009. As we can see from Figure 16, the 
number of sensor groups decreases to one after PDS eavesdropped Tulum for six days. 
Note that the sensor data was from Sept. 27th 2009 to Oct. 3rd 2009 because there was 
no sensor recorded on Oct. 2nd in the dataset of Tulum. To minimize an attacker’s 
effort, these six days are sufficient for him/her to understand Tulum and its residents. 
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Therefore, in the following experiment, PDS used the sensor log of these six days to 
conduct its deduction.  
 
Figure 15. The layout and sensor deployment of smart home Tulum [22]. Note that 
the sensing coverage of an area motion sensor is represented by an oval. The sensing 
coverage of the other sensors is individually represented by a circle. 
 
Figure 16. Total number of sensor groups of Tulum deduced by PDS over time.  
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(a) The temporal global sensor topology 
 
(b) The final global sensor topology 
Figure 17. The global sensor topology of Tulum. 
 
Figure 18. The sensor spatial relationships of Tulum and those deduced by PDS.  
      Figures 17(a) illustrates the temporal global sensor topology with all directed 
edges between sensors and the corresponding confidence values. In the case of Tulum, 𝛼 = 18 = 0?DI>;=CJ 3 and hence the resulting final sensor topology is the one shown in 
Figure 17(b). Note that we can see the advantage of Rule 2 since this rule enables 
showing that the couple living in Tulum are able to directly move from M025 to 
M027 and vice versa. Such statement is correct according to Figure 15. Figure 18 
shows the sensor spatial relationships of Tulum and those deduced by PDS. The total 
number of false deductions is 31, meaning that the inference accuracy of PDS on 
sensor relationships is 96.7%  ≅ A1 − D?<DEF ∗ 100%. 
      Next, PDS used the sensor-location deduction algorithm to deduce sensor 
locations. To deduce bedroom sensors in Tulum, PDS extracted all indoor activities 
that occurred between 2 am and 6 am from each of the six days. The corresponding 
sensor-ID lists are shown in Figure 19. After applying ARL with minSupport of 0.5 
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on these lists, PDS returned set {M018, M020, M022, M026}, which was therefore 
deduced as sensors in a bedroom. Since all other sensors in the topology except M021 
have no bidirectional edges with a half of set {M018, M020, M022, M026}, M021 
was also considered as a sensor deployed in the same bedroom. As compared with 
Figure 15, we can see that M018, M020, M021, and M022 are indeed in the same 
bedroom, but not M026. Nevertheless, a careful attacker might be able to notice from 
the global sensor topology that no directed edge exists between M026 and those 
bedroom sensors, so he/she knows that M026 is not deployed in the bedroom. In 
addition, the above deduction shows that PDS was unable to find that M019 is also in 
the same bedroom since the couple living in Tulum did not have lots of movements 
involving M019 during the eavesdropping period. 
      PDS continued inferring sensors in other bedrooms by discarding any sensor-ID 
list that contains M018, M020, M021, M022, or M026. The remaining sensor-ID list 
is only one as listed in Figure 20. Apparently, after applying ARL on this list, the 
returned sensor set will be the same, i.e., {M017, M029, M030, M031}, which was 
therefore deduced as sensors deployed in another bedroom. Moreover, as we can 
observe from the global sensor topology that only M028 has bidirectional edges with 
a half of this set, so M028 was also deduced as a sensor deployed in the same 
bedroom. In other words, sensors M017, M028, M029, M030, and M031 are all in the 
second bedroom. By verifying the above deduction results with Figure 15 again, we 
confirm that the deduction is correct. Due to the fact that the list shown in Figure 20 
contains four out of the five sensors, PDS continues deducing sensors in another 
bedroom by discarding all founded bedroom sensors from the list shown in Fig. 20. 
Since the list becomes empty, PDS stopped deducing bedroom sensors. In summary, 
PDS found two bedrooms in Tulum and most sensors that are deployed in these two 
bedrooms.  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
M018 M020 M021 M022 M025 M026 
M001 M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M011 M013 M020 M021 M022 M023 M024 
M017 M029 M030 M031 
M018 M019 M020 M021 M022 M025 M026 M027 
M018 M019 M021 M030 
M018 M020 M021 M022 M024 M025 M026 
M018 M019 M020 M022 M024 M026 
Figure 19. All sensor-ID lists between 2 am and 6 am of the entire eavesdropping 
period for deducing bedroom sensors in Tulum.    
3 M017 M029 M030 M031 
Figure 20. The remaining sensor-ID lists for deducing sensors in another bedroom of 
Tulum. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
M001 M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M009 M013 M014 M015 M023 M024 M026 M027 
M001 M002 M003 M006 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M015 M016 
M003 M013 M014 M015 
M003 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M001 M002 M004 M005 M006 M007 M009 
M001 M002 M003 M005 M006 M009 M010 M011 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M002 M003 M008 M009 M010 M011 M013 M014 M015 
M001 M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M009 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M014 M015 M016 
M001 M002 M003 M004 M006 M010 M011 M012 M013 M014 M015 
M003 M014 M015 M016 
M001 M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M009 M013 M014 M015 M016 M018 M020 M023 M024 
M001 M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M007 M008 M009 M010 M011 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M015 M016 
M003 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M015 M016 
M003 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M015 M016 
M003 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M015 M016 
M002 M003 M009 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M015 M016 
M001 M002 M003 M006 M009 M013 M014 M015 M018 M021 M022 
M001 M002 M004 M005 M006 M009 M013 M018 M020 M022 M023 M024 M026 M031 
M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M008 M009 M010 M011 M013 M014 M015 
M003 M015 M016 
M003 M015 M016 
M001 M003 M005 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M001 M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M009 M010 M011 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M001 M002 M003 M004 M005 M006 M007 M009 M010 M011 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M002 M003 M007 M009 M010 M011 M012 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M002 M003 M009 M012 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M002 M003 M009 M010 M011 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M002 M003 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M013 M014 M015 M016 
M003 M013 M014 M016 
M013 M014 M015 
M013 M014 M015 M016 
Figure 21. All sensor-ID lists between 6 pm and 7 pm of the entire eavesdropping 
period for deducing kitchen sensors in Tulum. 
      To deduce kitchen/dining room sensors of Tulum, PDS extracted all indoor 
activities that occurred between 6 pm and 7 pm from each of the 12 days. The total 
corresponding sensor-ID lists are 46, which are presented in Figure 21. After applying 
ARL with the same minSupport on these lists, set {M003, M014, M015, M016} is 
returned and consequently is deduced as sensors in the kitchen/dining room. To 
deduce more sensors in the same place, PDS recursively checked the global sensor 
topology and discovered that M002, M009, M010, M011, M012, and M013 all satisfy 
the condition. Therefore, they were also deduced as kitchen/dining room sensors. 
Apparently, the above deduction is correct according to the layout illustrated in Figure 
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15. However, PDS failed to deduce M007 and M008 since these two sensors do not 
have sufficient bidirectional edges with the other deduced kitchen/dining room 
sensors.  
      Finally, PDS deduced entrance sensors in Tulum by extracting all leave-back 
activities from the same time period. Four sensors (i.e., M001, M002, M008, and 
M010) were found in these activities. Since M002 and M010 have already been 
deduced as kitchen/dining room sensors, they cannot be entrance sensors at the same 
time. In other words, only M001 and M008 were deduced as entrance sensors. 
According to Figure 15, it might be incorrect that M001 is an entrance sensor because 
M005 is more close to the entrance. However, the truth is that the sensing coverage of 
M001 is large, which even covers the sensing area of M005. Therefore, even though 
M005 is the one near the entrance, M001 is still the first triggered sensor when the 
couple living in Tulum enters the house. By further referring to the global sensor 
topology, PDS knows that these two sensors do not connect to each other, implying 
that they are two different entrances in Tulum.  
      Figures 22 and 23, respectively, show the accumulated number of bedroom 
activities and kitchen/dining room activities in Tulum during the eavesdropping 
period. We can observe the following routines: (1) Many activities were found in the 
bedrooms from 08:00 to 09:00 and from 23:00 to 01:00, meaning that the couple 
living in Tulum may wake up in the first period and go to bed in the second period. (2) 
All activities in Tulum’s bedrooms are crossing-sensor indoor activities, implying that 
the couple does not have many still activities in their bedrooms. (3) No activities were 
discovered in the bedrooms from 16:00 to 19:00 but increasing activities were found 
in the kitchen/dining room during this period, meaning that the couple usually stays in 
the kitchen/dining room in this period. In fact, Figure 23 even shows the increasing 
number of activities in the kitchen/dining room between 15:00 and 21:00. In fact, the 
dining room is also the living room in Tulum (see Figure 15), which explains why the 
couple is very active in this place during this time period.  
      Table 2 lists all leave-back activities in Tulum during the eavesdropping period. 
Similarly to the old woman living in Milan, the couple living in Tulum did not go out 
together for more than one hour very often since only three leave-back activities were 
found by PDS. Particularly, we can see that they do not go out before 08:30 and after 
17:30. This information might be valuable for malicious attackers. Based on all above 
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deductions for Tulum, we confirm again that PDS is able to expose lots of privacy 
about this house and the couple. 
 
Figure 22. The total number of indoor activities in Tulum’s bedrooms during the 
entire eavesdropping period.  
 
Figure 23. The accumulated number of indoor activities in Tulum’s kitchen/dining 
room during the entire eavesdropping period. 
Table II. All leave-back activities in Tulum during the entire eavesdropping period. 
Date (y/m/d) Time period (24hr) Sensor ID 
2009/09/30 08:38 to 11:09 M008 
2009/10/01 08:35 to 11:04 M008 
2009/10/01 17:13 to 18:39 M001 
5. Discussion  
In the previous section, we utilize 𝑥 = 40  sec, 𝑦 = 10  sec, and 𝑧 = 3600  sec to 
identify indoor activities in both Milan and Tulum. In fact, according to the research 
shown in [36], it is difficult to determine an appropriate time to recognize a human 
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activity because the time span of a human activity could be various. Since PDS 
utilizes elders’ movements to derive a global sensor topology and deduce sensor 
locations, 𝑥 cannot be too short. Otherwise, PDS might not be able to capture a whole 
movement activity. Due to the fact that ARL is utilized by PDS to mine associated 
sensors in a smart home, the better results can be derived if more identified indoor 
activities contain at least three different sensors. Based on our experiences, setting 𝑥 
to 40 sec allows PDS to achieve the above identification, and this explains why 𝑥 is 
40 sec in our experiments.  
      It is not easy to determine a good value for parameter 𝑦. If 𝑦 is too small (e.g., 2 
sec), PDS is unable to identify many indoor activities, which in turn hampers the 
deduction performance of PDS. Besides, if 𝑦 is too small, PDS might not be able to 
identify a complete movement performed by an elder. On the other hand, if 𝑦 is too 
big (e.g., 30 sec), multiple residents’ movements might therefore be wrongly 
identified as an indoor activity by PDS, in turn affecting the deduction of PDS. In this 
paper, we found that 𝑦 = 10 sec is a reasonable setting. In our future work, we will 
investigate how to appropriately determine a value for 𝑦. For parameter 𝑧, we do not 
recommend to set a too small value because it is unable for PDS to effectively deduce 
entrance sensors. However, from the viewpoint of an attacker, he/she can 
comprehensively analyze elders’ leave-back patterns by setting a value depending on 
his/her preference.  
      Currently there are several privacy preservation approaches designed for smart 
homes. The first one is to assemble a robot to periodically trigger a motion and 
open/close sensor [23] so as to create an illusion for attackers that homeowners are at 
home. However, this approach does not affect PDS regardless of the trigger frequency. 
If the robot frequently triggers the sensor, a lot of identified indoor activities will 
contain this sensor, causing that this sensor has directed edges with almost all the 
other sensors in the resulting global sensor topology. For a normal sensor deployed in 
a fixed place, this is impossible because people are unable to move directly from this 
sensor to each of the rest sensors in a smart home. On the other hand, if the robot 
infrequently but still periodically triggers the sensor, the directed edges between this 
sensor and the other sensors will be mostly eliminated by Rule 1 and Rule 2.  
      Another advance approach is employing a complex robot, suggested by [23], that 
can move from room to room in a smart home. Clearly this approach successfully 
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creates the illusion that homeowners are at home, but it unfortunately helps PDS to 
deduce the global sensor topology even faster.  
      Applying some sophisticated cryptography algorithms (e.g., VPN) to encrypt the 
network traffics between smart sensors and the smart hub might be the most 
promising and effective solution to prevent the deduction of PDS since attackers are 
unable to analyze the corresponding traffic. However, this approach is expensive and 
might quickly consume energy for smart devices.   
 
6. Conclusion and future work 
In this paper, we have proposed PDS for deducing global sensor topology, sensor 
locations, and elders’ daily routines from a smart home from an attacker’s perspective. 
According to the experimental results, PDS is capable to infer most bedroom sensors, 
kitchen/dining room sensors, and entrance sensors. The key factor is that the 
deduction logic of PDS is based on the two reasonable assumptions, i.e., most people 
stay in their bedrooms and kitchens/dining rooms during 2 am and 6 am and during 6 
pm and 7 pm, respectively. With these two assumptions in mind, PDS can deduce 
sensors in bedrooms and kitchen/dining room of a smart home. Another key point 
enabling PDS to deduce more related sensors is the sensor spatial relationships 
offered by the derived global topology in which most connections between sensors 
caused by multiple elders’ concurrent movements are eliminated by Rules 1 and 2. 
Employing PDS, elders’ privacy could be seriously disclosed without physical 
invasion. Attackers are able to deduce when and how often elders stay in their 
bedrooms and kitchens/dining rooms, when elders leave home and come home, etc. 
      In the future, we would like to further extend PDS with other methods such as 
deep learning [45] or hidden Markov model (HMM for short) [46] to infer more 
sensor locations, such as living rooms and toilets, that PDS is currently unable to 
deduce. In addition, we would like to find out the best values for setting parameter 𝑦. 
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